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ROBBING THE CRADLE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEPLETING 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORPHAN DRUG 
MANUFACTURERS AND IMPOSING STRICTER RESEARCH 
GUIDELINES FOR RARE PEDIATRIC DISEASES 
CHERYL L. KOZDREY* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Controversy surrounding drug pricing is ever-present.  However, 
the focus on pricing practices has shifted with the influx of orphan drug 
designations.  Many big players in the pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries have harvested enormous profits by finding unique ways to 
manipulate the Orphan Drug Act’s incentive program.  Meanwhile, 
scientific research startups have viewed the Act as a gateway to break 
into the pharmaceutical sector.  As a result of the industry’s growing 
interest in the orphan drug market, patients suffering from rare diseases 
enjoy tremendous benefits from medicinal innovation that would have 
otherwise gone undiscovered.  In addition, the Act’s financial 
incentives make market entry more feasible for young pharmaceutical 
and biotech companies, thereby expanding industry competition.  So, 
why have politicians begun to attack the orphan drug market?  Through 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the current Administration has slashed tax 
incentives for orphan drug manufacturers in half.  In addition, the FDA 
issued a Guidance that recommends eliminating research exemptions 
previously available to pediatric subpopulations under the Pediatric 
Research Equity Act.  These joint measures attempt to address 
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profitable exploitation of the Orphan Drug Act.  However, they 
continue to ignore patient price concerns as well as the undeniable 
innovative benefits that flow from the Orphan Drug Act.  Reducing tax 
credits and forcing drug makers to engage in more extensive pediatric 
research for rare diseases may reduce big pharma’s profits.  However, 
it will not save patients money or make more treatments available to 
them.  Instead, pharmaceutical and biotech firms are incentivized to 
continue operating free from transparency while price-gouging orphan 
drug consumers, or to reduce their engagement in the pediatric orphan 
drug market and seek more profitable ventures.  In the end, the only 
groups that stand to lose are children suffering from rare diseases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The National Organization for Rare Diseases (“NORD”) kick-
started 2018 with a commemoration, celebrating the 35th anniversary 
of the Orphan Drug Act (“ODA”), a law that provides incentives for the 
development of treatments for rare diseases.1  However, NORD may 
have less to celebrate and more to advocate for in coming years due to 
reduced financial incentives under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“Tax 
Bill”), as well as stricter research guidelines proposed in the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) guidance entitled “Clarification of 
Orphan Designations of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric 
Subpopulations of Common Diseases” (“Guidance”).  The same is true 
for Tasha Nelson, Courtney Waller, and Rebecca Mauldin, all mothers 
of children afflicted with rare diseases. 
Ms. Nelson, whose son Jack was only one-month old when he was 
diagnosed with cystic fibrosis, explains, “[a]ny dime you take from a 
company that is working toward saving my son’s life is an insult to my 
                                                          
1. National Organization for Rare Diseases, NORD and the Orphan Drug Act 
Celebrate 35th Anniversaries, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.pr 
newswire.com/news-releases/nord-and-the-orphan-drug-act-celebrate-35th-annivers 
aries-300577648.html [hereinafter NORD].  
3
Kozdrey: Robbing the Cradle: The Implications of Depleting Financial Incen
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019
Kozdrey camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 7/10/2019  9:06 AM 
390 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
family.”2  Yet, that is precisely what the Tax Bill has done by slashing 
tax credits for the research and development (“R&D”) of orphan drugs 
in half.3  Nelson fears that drug companies “may not have the 
resources” to help Jack fight cystic fibrosis if tax breaks are reduced or 
eliminated.4  While there may be some debate about the pharmaceutical 
industry’s access to abundant financial resources, Nelson’s belief that 
the industry will reduce its participation in the orphan drug market is 
merited.  Indeed, a June 2015 analysis prepared for NORD and the 
Biotechnology Innovation Organization (“BIO”) found that without the 
orphan drug tax credit, approximately 33% fewer orphan therapies will 
be developed and approved over the next ten years.5 
Another argument in opposition of reduced tax incentives for 
orphan drug manufacturers stems from pricing concerns.  Orphan drugs 
are notorious for their hefty price tags.  However, some drug 
manufacturers have alleviated the burden on consumers by offering 
company-sponsored copays, which can significantly reduce out-of-
pocket expenses for patients.6  For example, through a drug company’s 
copay program, Jack’s mother pays a mere $25 per month for his cystic 
fibrosis treatment, Pulmozyme — a deep discount compared to its 
market price of $6,000 per month.7  If the tax credit has a significant 
enough impact on manufacturers’ profit margin, some fear consumer 
pricing for orphan drugs will increase or company-sponsored discount 
programs will be eliminated. 
Although families of children afflicted with rare diseases 
vehemently oppose orphan tax credit reductions, curiously, 
pharmaceutical companies are not fighting back against these 
                                                          
2. Meghan Holohan, Unlikely Lobbyists: Parents of Kids with Rare Diseases 
Fight Against Tax Bill, TODAY (Nov. 13, 2017, 3:38 PM), https://www.today.com 
/parents/parents-kids-rare-diseases-rally-against-tax-bill-t118672.  
3. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, pt. V, sec. 13401, § 45C, 131 
Stat. 2054 (2017) (reducing the orphan drug tax credit from 25% to 50%).  
4. Holohan, supra note 2. 
5. BIOTECH. INDUSTRY ORG. & NAT. ORG. FOR RARE DISORDERS, IMPACT OF 
THE ORPHAN DRUG TAX CREDIT ON TREATMENTS FOR RARE DISEASES (June 2015), 
https://rarediseases.org/assets/files/white-papers/2015-06-17.nord-bio-ey-odtc.pdf.  
6. Holohan, supra note 2.   
7. Id. (explaining, additionally, that under a similar program, Ms. Mauldin, 
whose son Jonathan has spent most of his life battling a rare cancer called Langerhans 
cell histiocytosis, pays only $10 of the $1,500 monthly cost of his treatment). 
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diminished incentives.  This is largely attributed to the Tax Bill’s 
accompanying provisions, which provide the companies with an even 
greater benefits through reduced corporate tax rates and special 
repatriation rates.8 
Pharmaceutical companies are, however, voicing concerns over the 
FDA’s Guidance that seeks to eliminate Pediatric Research Equity Act 
(“PREA”) exemptions previously available to some orphan 
subpopulations.  For over fifteen years, drugs with a pediatric-
subpopulation orphan designation were exempt from PREA.  Meaning, 
manufacturers were not required to conduct additional safety and 
efficacy trials on children when applying for FDA approval on an adult 
indication.  At least one drug maker fears that a departure from this 
exemption “is likely to impede and delay development of important 
new medicines for children because without an orphan drug 
designation, developing novel drugs and biologics for children is more 
difficult and[,] in many cases, practically impossible.”9 
This article draws attention to the anticipated adverse implications 
of depleting financial incentives for orphan drug manufacturers and 
imposing stricter research guidelines for rare pediatric diseases.  Part I 
provides an overview of the ODA, as well as pediatric drug legislation 
including the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (“BPCA”) and 
PREA.  Part II focuses on the loopholes imbedded in these statutes and 
the opportunistic efforts drug manufactures have used to exploit them.  
Part III discusses the current administration’s two-fold effort to address 
these abuses using the Tax Bill and FDA’s Guidance.  Part IV observes 
that these administrative efforts could have an adverse impact on the 
pricing and availability of orphan drugs for pediatric subpopulations 
and analyzes the evidence supporting and opposing these predictions.  
                                                          
8. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CLARIFICATION OF ORPHAN DESIGNATION 
OF DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS FOR PEDIATRIC SUBPOPULATIONS OF COMMON DISEASES: 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (July 27, 2018) [hereinafter GUIDANCE]. 
9. Letter from Carry A. Neil, M.D., Chief Scientific Officer, Aevi Genomic 
Medicine, to Docket Management Branch, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Re: Docket 
No. FDA-2017-D-6380, Clarification of Orphan Drug Designation of Drugs and 
Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common Diseases; Draft Guidance for 
Industry (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-D-
6380-0015 [hereinafter Aevi Letter]; see also Developers Voice Concerns Over Draft 
Guidance Closing Orphan Drug Loophole, FDA NEWS: DRUG DAILY BULLETIN (Feb. 
27, 2018), https://www.fdanews.com/articles/185776-developers-voice-concern-over 
-draft-guidance-closing-orphan-drug-loophole. 
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The article concludes by suggesting that the Tax Bill and Guidance may 
have an unsubstantial effect on pricing patterns in the orphan drug 
market.  However, these joint administrative efforts are likely to cause 
reduced engagement in the pediatric orphan drug market, thereby 
diminishing access to and availability of treatments for children 
suffering from rare diseases. 
I. ORPHANS AND TWINS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ODA AND 
CONTIGUOUS PEDIATRIC DRUG LEGISLATION 
While the Tax Bill and Guidance are independent administrative 
efforts, their joint impact threatens to have an adverse effect on the cost 
and accessibility of orphan treatments for ill children.  The Tax Bill 
slashes tax incentives for all orphan drugs, while the PREA Guidance 
makes it more difficult for drug manufacturers to receive orphan 
designations for pediatric treatments.  To properly analyze the potential 
effects of the Tax Bill and PREA Guidance, it is necessary to 
understand the history of the ODA, and the legislation specific to 
pediatric patient populations including PREA and its predecessor, 
BPCA. 
A. History of the Orphan Drug Act 
Pharmaceutical research in the United States relies on a 
combination of government funding and private investment.10  “The 
revenue potential of a drug in treating a particular disease can influence 
for-profit manufacturers’ willingness to devote necessary resources to 
its development.”11  Rare diseases, also commonly referred to as 
“orphan diseases,” are defined as those which affect 200,000 or fewer 
patients within the United States.12  Traditionally, diseases that affect 
                                                          
10. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Innovation and the Orphan Drug Act, 1983-2009: 
Regulatory and Clinical Characteristics of Approved Orphan Drugs, in RARE & 
ORPHAN PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, a report by 
INST. OF MED. U.S. COMM. ON ACCELERATING RARE DISEASE RESEARCH & ORPHAN 
PROD. DEV., (Field MJ & Boat TF eds., 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
books/NBK56187. 
11. Id. 
12. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (1997) (“[T]he term ‘rare disease or condition’ 
means any disease or condition which (A) affects less than 200,000 persons in the 
United States, or (B) affects more than 200,000 in the United States and for which 
6
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such a limited population do not permit recovery of private research 
investment.13  “As their name implies, ‘orphan’ drugs were drugs that 
nobody wanted to produce . . . because too few people had the different 
diseases.”14  Consequently, pharmaceutical companies believed that 
R&D expenditures on such drugs could not be recouped.15  Without 
adequate incentives available to entice participation in the orphan drug 
market, therapeutic products for orphan conditions developed slowly if 
at all.16  To address these concerns and stimulate private-industry R&D 
for treatments with modest project potential, a three-fold effort was set 
in place between 1982 and 1983.17  First, the FDA created the Office of 
Orphan Products Development, which is “dedicated to promoting the 
development of products that demonstrate promise for the diagnosis 
and/or treatment of rare diseases.”18  Shortly thereafter, Congress 
passed the ODA and, on January 4, 1983, President Reagan signed it 
into law.19  Finally, “the coalition of patient advocates formally 
established NORD as a nonprofit organization to provide advocacy, 
education, research and patient/family services for all Americans 
affected by rare diseases.”20  Central to these efforts was the ODA,21 
which was aimed at solving an important problem – “how to induce a 
                                                          
there is no reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in 
the United States a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in 
the United States of such drug.”).   
13. Kesselheim, supra note 10.  
14. RONALD J. VOGEL, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 206 
(2007). 
15. Id. 
16. Kesselheim, supra note 10. 
17. STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 39 
(2d ed. 2007). 
18. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 147 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). 
19. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) [hereinafter 
ODA]; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360aa-ff (2017) (addressing drugs for rare diseases or 
conditions under the Orphan Drug Act). 
20. NORD, supra note 1. 
21. ODA, supra note 19.  
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market-driven pharmaceutical industry to develop new therapeutics for 
diseases affecting relatively small numbers of persons.”22 
The ODA has succeeded in many of its goals.23  It increased the 
availability and approval of drugs to treat low-prevalence conditions,24 
decreased mortality rates for persons with orphan conditions,25 and 
made market participation more feasible for startup bio-pharma 
manufacturers.26  The ODA has also been instrumental in the 
development of treatments for pediatric subpopulations.27 
1. The ODA’s Impact on Pediatric Drug Development 
In a study published by the American Academy of Pediatrics in 
2012, researchers provided a ten-year analysis focused on the ODA’s 
progress in stimulating pediatric drug production.28  The study reports 
“increasing pediatric orphan product designations and approvals from 
2000 to 2009,” indicating that “the [ODA] has continued to address this 
important unmet need.”29  Specifically, the study reports that, from 
2000 to 2009, 26% of all orphan drugs that received marketing approval 
were for pediatric diseases.30  Further, “[t]he proportion of approvals 
for pediatric products increased from 17.5% . . . in the first half of the 
                                                          
22. Robert A. Bohrer, It’s the Antigen Stupid: A Risk/Reward Approach to the 
Problem of Orphan Drug Act Exclusivity for Monoclonal Antibody Therapeutics, 5 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003). 
23. Id. at 2 (“Although some drugs for small patient populations have been 
exceedingly profitable, the need for special incentives to spur pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to undertake the costly and risky process of drug development and 
research for less common diseases was clear to the Congressional sponsors of the Act 
and the Act has been largely judged a success.”).   
24. PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 121.  
25. Id. 
26. Aevi Letter, supra note 9 (noting that incentives under the ODA are 
extremely important to small pharmaceutical companies).   
27. See generally Chandana Thorat, et al., What the Orphan Drug Act Has Done 
Lately for Children with Rare Diseases: A 10-Year Analysis, 29 PEDIATRICS 516 
(2012); see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(9)(iv) (2015) (defining pediatric populations 
as including patients aged “birth to 16 years, including age groups often called 
neonates, infants, children, and adolescents”).   
28. Thorat, supra note 27, at 516–21.   
29. Id. at 516. 
30. Id. 
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decade, to 30.8% . . . in the second.”31  Although there have been very 
few systematic studies quantifying the ODA’s contribution to drug 
development for children with rare diseases, these calculations provide 
a promising outlook on the improvement of drug availability for 
pediatric subpopulations.32 
2. The ODA’s Incentive Structure 
The ODA’s success in expanding the availability of drugs for 
ailments afflicting small patient populations is derived from the four 
extremely generous financial incentives it offers orphan drug 
manufactures.33  First, no patent is necessary to gain market 
exclusivity.34  Once the FDA’s Office of Orphan Products 
Development grants orphan drug status to a new product, the drug 
company receives exclusive marketing rights for seven years.35  This 
means that the FDA will not grant approval to any other drug for the 
same indication within that seven-year period.36  Second, the FDA 
provides grant money to companies in order to defray the costs of 
testing the drugs.37  Third, the FDA provides assistance in “protocol 
design and new drug applications (NDA) or product license approval 
(PLA) applications.”38  Finally, the ODA offers a tax credit for clinical 
R&D expenditures, which has raised great concern after being 
significantly reduced from 50% to 25% by the newly enacted Tax 
Bill.39 
                                                          
31. Id.   
32. Id. at 517 (reporting that “there have been no systematic analysis” 
quantifying the ODA’s contribution to pediatric drug development) (emphasis added).   
33. VOGEL, supra note 14, at 207. 
34. See id. 
35. 21 U.S.C. §360cc(a) (2017); see also VOGEL, supra note 14, at 207. 
36. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2017) (“[T]he Secretary may not approve another 
application . . . for the same drug for the same disease or condition for a person who 
is not the holder of such approved application or of such license until the expiration 
of seven years form the date of the approval of the approved application or the 
issuance of the license.”).  
37. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (2017); see also VOGEL, supra note 14, at 207. 
38. SCHWEITZER, supra note 17, at 39; 21 U.S.C § 360aa (2017); see also Bohrer, 
supra note 22, at 18 n.32. 
39. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, pt. V, sec. 13401, § 45C, 131 
Stat. 2054 (2017).  
9
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B. BPCA and PREA: The Contiguous Pediatric Drug Statutes 
Another area of contention arises where the ODA and pediatric 
drug legislation intersect.  Through the ODA, Congress effectively 
addressed the once disparate availability of treatments for patients with 
rare diseases.40  However, many years passed before Congress 
recognized the inadequate availability of safe and effective drugs for 
another underserved population – children.41  “[I]n 2001, only twenty 
percent of prescription medications were tested and approved for use in 
children.”42  Children nonetheless required treatment, and physicians 
engaged in “off-label”43 prescription practices whereby children 
received drugs approved exclusively for adults.44  It became common 
practice to dose children with adjusted quantities of the medication 
calculated solely according to their lower body weight.45  However, this 
dosing standard was highly inaccurate and problematic because it did 
not take into account the metabolic differences between a child and an 
adult.46  Additionally, “the lack of age-appropriate formulations, such 
                                                          
40. Bohrer, supra note 22, at 2 (noting the ODA is judged as a success).   
41. The ODA was passed in 1983.  Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 
Stat. 2049 (1983).  Meanwhile, the first legislative effort that specifically addressed 
the need for adequate clinical studies in children came in 1997 with the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDMA), which was subsequently 
reenacted through the BPCA in 2002. See Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997); see also Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).  
42. Lisa Jerles, Note, The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act and the 
Pediatric Research Equity Act – Helping or Hurting America’s Children, 6 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 515, 516 (2008) (citation omitted).  
43. Off-label use refers to the use of an “FDA-approved medical product for a 
use that has not been studied yet” and is also referred to as “unapproved use of an 
approved product.”  U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GLOSSARY OF TERMS, 
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/ClinicalTrials/ucm410359.htm#O-1 (last visited 
May 1, 2019).  
44. See Joanna K. Sax, Reforming FDA Policy for Pediatric Testing: Challenges 
and Changes in the Wake of Studies Using Antidepressant Drugs, 4 IND. HEALTH L. 
REV. 61, 65 (2007) (“[B]ecause relatively few drugs are tested on pediatric 
populations, doctors tend to ‘dose down’ adult dosages to account for the lower body 
weight in children.”).   
45. Jerles, supra note 42, at 516; see also Sax, supra note 44, at 62. 
46. Sax, supra note 44, at 76 (“The protocol of ‘down dosing’ adult 
prescriptions to account for the smaller size of children does not address physiological 
10
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as liquid forms for children who cannot yet swallow drugs in pill form, 
[made] it difficult to administer medication to children.”47 
To curb these problems, Congress created several programs to 
promote pediatric studies and changed the regulatory landscape.48  
Today, the most important of these legislative efforts are the BPCA49 
and PREA50, enacted in 2002 and 2003 respectively.  Although both 
Acts are intended to promote pediatric studies, each operates 
differently.  The BPCA operates as a “carrot,” incentivizing drug 
manufacturers with an additional six months of market exclusivity 
when it submits reports of pediatric studies that fairly respond to a 
written request from the FDA and are conducted in accordance with 
generally applicable scientific principles and protocols.51  Meanwhile, 
PREA operates as the “stick,” requiring drug makers to conduct studies 
that reflect “an assessment of safety and effectiveness (including dosing 
information) for the proposed indication in all relevant pediatric 
subpopulations.”52 
The combined impact of BPCA and PREA has been highly 
successful in providing parents and providers with essential information 
on the safety and efficacy of drugs used to treat children.53  In fact, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics asserts that “[c]hildren are safer 
                                                          
differences between adults and children.”); Jerles, supra note 42, at 517 n.9 (“The 
drug Cyclosporine was approved for adults to counter organ rejection following 
transplants.  The drug was then used in children without testing and without the same 
success.  Researchers eventually discovered that children metabolize Cyclosporine 
much faster than adults, therefore needing more frequent dosing.”) (citations omitted).   
47. Jerles, supra note 42, at 517 (citation omitted).  
48. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 3.   
49. Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 
(2002). 
50. Pediatric Research Equity Act, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 (2003).   
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2017).   
52. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 2–3 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-155 (2003), codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 355c (2017)).   
53. Letter from American Academy of Pediatrics, et al., to Scott Gottlieb, 
Commissioner, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., RE: Docket No. FDA-2017-D-6380, 
Clarification of Orphan Designation of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric 
Subpopulations of Common Diseases; Draft Guidance of Industry; Availability, 1 
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov/ document?D=FDA-2017-D-6380-0010 
[hereinafter AAP Letter] (“[M]ore than 640 drugs and biologics [have been] relabeled 
with important information about their use in children”).   
11
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because of what we have learned through BPCA and PREA studies, and 
the pediatricians who care for them are better equipped to make clinical 
decisions for their patients.”54  However, PREA contains a “loophole,” 
which permits orphan drug manufacturers to seek exemptions from 
some of their obligations to conduct pediatric studies.55  The American 
Academy of Pediatrics and its partners explain: 
Currently, a drug for a common disease, that would otherwise not be 
eligible for orphan status, can receive orphan status for just the 
pediatric population with that disease, if such population is under 
200,000.  After receiving that designation, the sponsor can decide not 
to pursue pediatric drug studies at all, despite requesting the pediatric 
designation.56 
Recognition of this loophole has given rise to increased scrutiny of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s opportunistic exploitation of ODA 
incentives.57 
II. FILLING THE PIGGYBANK: AN EXPLANATION OF ODA MISUSES, 
THE PREA LOOPHOLE, AND THE INTERPLAY OF PHARMA-ECONOMICS 
Because “[t]he pharmaceutical industry is a competitive and 
potentially very lucrative marketplace,” the high-stakes business 
challenges it faces can harness significant risks as well as substantial 
rewards.58  Despite projections from EvaluatePharma’s World Preview 
estimating that worldwide pharmaceutical drug sales will reach more 
than $1 trillion by 2022, this forecast actually reflects a decrease for the 
same period last year.59  This is the first time in ten years that drug sales 
                                                          
54. Id.  
55. Id.; see infra Part I, sec. B (explaining the operative details of the PREA 
“loophole”). 
56. AAP Letter, supra note 53, at 1; see also infra Part I, sec. B.  
57. AAP Letter, supra note 53, at 1 (“This loophole allows sponsors to exploit 
the process and this must change.”). 
58. Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons 
From Hatch-Waxman and an Early Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 629, 640 (2010).  
59. Biotech Industry Moves Towards a Patent Cliff, THE BIO REPORT, at 0:58 
(July 13, 2017) (download through iTunes podcast query) [hereinafter THE BIO 
REPORT] (interviewing Antonio Iervolino, head of forecasting for EvaluatePharma). 
12
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have been projected to fall instead of rise, a phenomenon that 
forecasters attribute to pricing pressures as well as the advent of more 
biosimilar products.60  While price-gouging and concerns about 
consumer affordability in the capitalistic pharmaceutical market are 
nothing new to the political pulpit, “pushback from consumers, 
[pharmacy benefit managers], payers and lawmakers has become much 
stronger as of late.”61 
In the drug development market, “[p]rofits are measured in billions 
of dollars in annual sales and unexpected, sudden market collapses are 
not uncommon.”62  This juxtaposition incentivizes big-players in the 
pharmaceutical and biotech industries to engage in unconventional and 
creative strategies.  Specifically, drug makers caught the attention of 
political forces due to their exploitation of the orphan drug system, as 
well as their use of the PREA “loophole” to avoid mandatory R&D 
testing in children. 
A. Exploiting Orphans: How Big Pharma Misuses the ODA to 
Render Big Profits 
The exploitation of ODA incentives did not begin with the pediatric 
market and certainly does not end there either.  These efforts are far 
more expansive.  For example, although ODA policies were intended 
to incentivize drug companies to participate in markets for 
underrepresented and otherwise less profitable diseases, ironically, 
“[s]even of the [ten] best-selling drugs in the country in 2015 were 
orphan drugs.”63  Critics claim that these high yield returns on orphan 
drugs are a result of drug manufacturers gaming the system by seeking 
an orphan designation for drugs that were “first approved for the mass 
                                                          
60. Id. at 3:18; see also EVALUATEPHARMA, WORLD PREVIEW 2017, OUTLOOK 
TO 2022 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (10th ed. June 2017), http://info.evaluategroup. 
com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/WP2017-SUM.pdf. 
61. Jacob Bell, Pricing Pressures Lower Drug Sales Forecasts, New Report 
Finds, BIOPHARMADIVE.COM (June 21, 2017), https://www.bropharmadive.com/ 
news/evaluatepharma-pricing-report-world-preview/445516.  
62. Seaman, supra note 58, at 640.   
63. Sarah Janes Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugs for Rare Diseases Have 
Become Uncommonly Rich Monopolies, NPR: HEALTH INC. (Jan. 17, 2017, 4:59 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/01/17/509506836/drugs-for-rare-dise 
ases-have-become-uncommonly-rich-monopolies.  
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market and later won approval for a rare disease.”64  Conversely, some 
drugs have been introduced with an orphan status to gain financial 
subsidies and market exclusivity, then are continuously reintroduced to 
treat other ailments, thereby making the “leap from orphan to rolling 
blockbuster.”65 
Critics say these drugs are not “true” orphans but are being misused 
to give manufacturers a market monopoly.66  Botox, Allergan’s best-
selling product, provides an illustration of this practice.  Botox received 
orphan approval in 1984 to treat painful muscle spasms of the eye, 
uncontrolled blinking, and neck pain.67  Since then, the FDA has 
approved Botox for two additional orphan designations and as a “mass 
market drug to treat a variety of ailments, including chronic migraines 
and wrinkles.”68  “Today, there are 5 million doses of Botox 
administered annually in North America, which translates into 
approximately $1.5 billion in sales.”69 
Another “concern that has long plagued the ODA is the potential 
for drug developers to . . . artificially subdivide diseases to create 
subgroups of patients that fall under the orphan drug prevalence 
threshold – a practice referred to as ‘salami slicing.’”70  For example, 
Epogen received an orphan designation in 1986 and final FDA approval 
in 1989 to treat anemia caused by end-stage renal failure.71  Shortly 
thereafter, Epogen became widely prescribed for a broad range of 
patients with anemia unrelated to end-stage renal failure.72  
“Consequently, through off-label use . . . in patients without end-stage 
                                                          
64. Id. 
65. Michael N. Abrams & Rita E. Numerof, The Growing Orphan-Drug 
Paradigm, 25 BIOPHARM INTERNATIONAL.COM (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.biopharm 
international.com/growing-orphan-drug-paradigm-0.  
66. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63.  
67. Abrams & Numerof, supra note 65.   
68. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63.  
69. Abrams & Numerof, supra note 65.  
70. Shannon Gibson & Barbara von Tigerstrom, Orphan Drug Incentives in the 
Pharmacogenomic Context: Policy Responses in the US and Canada, 2 J.L. & 
BIOSCIENCES 263, 268 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsv013 (citing David 
Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics: A 
Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 365 (2005)).   
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
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renal disease, Epogen became a blockbuster drug and generated billions 
of dollars in revenue for its manufacturer.”73  Similarly, Genentech 
developed human growth hormone (hGH) to treat children with 
hypopituitary dwarfism, then later received mass profits for the drug’s 
use to treat other growth deficiencies.74 
Due to the high profitability, more compelling market value 
propositions, and a faster route to market, “[t]he orphan drug market is 
expected to almost double during the 2016-22 period, peaking at 
$209bn in 2022.”75  “No one disputes that orphan drugs have helped or 
saved hundreds of thousands of patients suffering from debilitating or 
even fatal rare diseases.”76  Yet, as former Representative Henry 
Waxman points out, drug manufacturers have turned the ODA on its 
head by using it as the “basis of manipulating the system . . . to make 
much more money than they would in an open competitive market.”77 
B. Neglecting the Children: How the PREA Loophole Exempts Drug 
Makers from R&D Requirements in Pediatric Subpopulations 
Beyond creative abuses of the ODA, politicians have identified a 
secondary problem that lies at the intersection of PREA and the ODA.  
“Section 505B(k) of the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act contains a 
statutory exemption from the requirement to conduct pediatric studies 
under PREA for certain drugs with orphan designations.”78  The FDA 
explains, this unintended “loophole” allows sponsors to “submit a 
marketing application for use of its drug in the non-orphan adult 
population,” then use the ODA to get a pediatric-subpopulation 
                                                          
73. Id.  
74. Robert A. Bohrer & John T. Prince, A Tale of Two Proteins: The FDA’s 
Uncertain Interpretation of the Orphan Drug Act, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 365, 381 
(1999) (quoting JOHN HENKEL, ORPHAN DRUG PRODUCTS: NEW HOPE FOR PEOPLE 
WITH RARE DISORDERS, FDA SPECIAL REPORT ON NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1995)). 
75. EVALUATEPHARMA, supra note 60, at 3. 
76. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63. 
77. Id.   
78. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 4 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355c(k) (2017)).  
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designation for the juvenile subset of the disease.79  By way of example, 
for “a condition like inflammatory bowel disease (IBD), a drug may be 
approved to treat the large population of adults with the condition but 
then the same drug may be granted an orphan designation to treat a 
subset of children suffering from IBD.”80  Due to this designation, the 
drug’s sponsor is “exempt from conducting the pediatric studies 
normally required under PREA when seeking approval of the adult 
indication.”81 
This means, when a sponsor seeks FDA approval for a drug 
intended to treat a common adult illness, it can use an orphan 
designation get around PREA testing requirements if that illness occurs 
rarely in children.  FDA Commissioner Dr. Scott Gottlieb explains, 
“once a drug receives an orphan designation for a pediatric population 
of the adult disease, the drug then becomes statutorily exempt from the 
requirements of PREA.”82 
For example, if FDA grants pediatric-subpopulations designation for 
a sponsor’s drug for pediatric ulcerative colitis and the sponsor 
submits an NDA . . . for its drug to treat ulcerative colitis in adults, 
the sponsor would be exempt from having to conduct pediatric 
studies under PREA by virtue of having the pediatric-subpopulation 
designation for pediatric ulcerative colitis.  This is despite the fact 
that prevalence of the ulcerative colitis indication as a whole is 
greater than 200,000 and despite the fact that pediatric ulcerative 
colitis does not meet the definition of an orphan subset under 21 
C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13).83 
                                                          
79. Announcement of the Availability of Clarification of Orphan Designation 
of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common Diseases; Guidance 
for Industry, 83 Fed. Reg. 35655 (July 27, 2018). 
80. Zachary Brennan, FDA to Close Loophole Allowing Companies to Skirt 
Pediatric Study Requirements, RAPS: REGULATORY FOCUS (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%e2%84%a2/news-articles/2017/9/fda-to-
close-loophole-allowing-companies-to-skirt-pediatric-study-requirements.  
81. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 4. 
82. Scott Gottlieb, M.D., FDA is Advancing the Goals of the Orphan Drug Act, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.: FDA VOICES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/FDAVoices/ucm612012.htm; see also Brennan, supra note 
80.  
83. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 4; 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13).  
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Gottlieb contends that this creates a “loophole” which directly opposes 
congressional intent.84  He asserts, “[n]obody envisioned this 
unintended conflict between the original ODA and the provisions 
outlined in PREA,” which effectively provides drug makers with a “free 
pass from having to study drugs in pediatric uses.”85  Gottlieb 
continues, “rather than ensuring more pediatric research, as Congress 
envisioned, we can end up with fewer pediatric studies.”86 
Although this “loophole” has existed for the entire fifteen years 
since PREA’s enactment, it has only recently fostered negative 
attention.  This leaves some with the impression that Gottlieb is 
sensationalizing the problem.  For example, NORD contends that the 
FDA has “not provide[d] sufficient evidence of the perceived 
loophole;” accordingly, the organization has asked the FDA for further 
evidence that this loophole is being exploited, including information 
about how many therapies were exempted from PREA, while also 
receiving a pediatric subpopulation orphan designation, and not being 
subject to additional pediatric testing.87  In addition, the Guidance itself 
makes clear that, although drugs with ODA designations are exempt 
from PREA, they nonetheless can be the subject of a written request for 
pediatric testing under BPCA.88  This mechanism seems to undermine 
Gottlieb’s argument that drug makers are receiving a “free pass” from 
studying drugs in pediatric uses.89  Nevertheless, the FDA continues to 
scrutinize the pharmaceutical industry’s use of the PREA “loophole” as 
                                                          
84. Gottlieb, supra note 82.   
85. Id.; see also Brennan, supra note 80.  
86. Gottlieb, supra note 82.  
87. NHGRI Launches Strategic Planning Process for Genomic Research and 
Funding, CENTERWATCH (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.centerwatch.com/cwweekly 
/2018/02/26/nhgri-launches-strategic-planning-process-genomic-research-funding.  
88. GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 3 (explaining that BPCA provides “an additional 
six months of market exclusivity when a sponsor submits reports of pediatric studies 
that fairly respond to a written request from FDA and are conducted in accordance 
with generally applicable scientific principles and protocols”); see also SAFE & 
EFFECTIVE MEDICINES FOR CHILDREN: PEDIATRIC STUDIES CONDUCTED UNDER THE 
BEST PHARMACEUTICALS FOR CHILDREN ACT & THE PEDIATRIC RESEARCH EQUITY 
ACT (Marilyn J. Field & Thomas F. Boat, eds., National Academies Press 2012), 
https://www.nap.edu/read/13311/chapter/3#34 (“Drugs with designations under the 
Orphan Drug Act are exempt under PREA but can be the subject of written requests”).   
89. See Gottlieb, supra note 82 (emphasis added).   
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a measure to avoid the added time and monetary investments for R&D 
in limited pediatric subpopulations. 
Yet, as discussed in Part I, these strategic measures do not always 
result in detrimental effects on patients.  One benefit is shown through 
the influx of treatments for pediatric populations regardless of the 
shortcomings that flow from the “loophole.”  Another benefit flows 
from the orphan drug system, which has undoubtedly incentivized the 
development of treatments for rare aliments that may have otherwise 
gone unattended.  This is true despite concerns about excess 
profitability and repurposing.90  Notwithstanding these positive 
advancements, the high price of brand-name prescription drugs in the 
mass market, as well as the orphan drug market, remains an ever-
present and significant concern that cannot be ignored.  In fact, 
“[s]crutiny of drug prices around the globe is expected to exert growing 
pressure on the biopharmaceutical sector” in the coming years.91 
Unfortunately, several challenges stand in the way of 
accomplishing reasonable pricing models in the pharmaceutical sector.  
Brett Saunders, Chief Executive Officer of Allergan, points out that one 
of the problems lies with opposition from some drug companies who 
resist voluntary price capping92 and continue to increase list prices to 
exorbitant levels.  However, the greater challenge lies with 
incompatible regulatory structures that fail to balance the economic 
interests of pharmaceutical manufacturers with important patient 
protections. 
III. TAKING CANDY FROM A BABY AND IMPOSING STRICTER RULES: 
HOW THE TAX BILL CUT INCENTIVES FOR ORPHAN DRUG SPONSORS, 
AND THE GUIDANCE EXPANDED PEDIATRIC R&D REQUIREMENTS 
UNDER PREA 
The current administration has taken a two-fold approach to 
addressing some of the problems that plague the industry’s pediatric 
orphan drug sector.  The first approach uses the Tax Bill to reduce the 
                                                          
90. See Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63.  
91. THE BIO REPORT, supra note 59, at 0:53.   
92. See Jared S. Hopkins, Allergan CEO Pushes for Trump to Lead Drug Price 
Discussions, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2017, 6:02 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2017-02-23/allergan-ceo-pushes-for-trump-to-lead-drug-price-restraint 
-talks.   
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orphan tax credit and deter excessive uses of the ODA.93  The second 
approach flows from the FDA Guidance, which would impose stricter 
pediatric research requirements for orphan drugs and reduce the number 
of juvenile treatments that qualify for an orphan designation.94  Before 
evaluating the compatibility and effect of these administrative efforts, 
it is important to understand some of their intricacies. 
A. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Slashes Orphan Drug Incentives 
The Tax Bill is a broad and multi-dimensional piece of legislation 
with wide-ranging effects on personal, as well as business economics.95  
Although the Tax Bill does not exclusively target the pharmaceutical 
industry, three of its key provision have significant impacts on the 
industry by lowering corporate tax rates,96 providing a special 
repatriation rate,97 and reducing the orphan tax credit.98  The first two 
provisions have the potential to provide enormous benefits to drug 
manufacturers.  For instance, the corporate tax rate has been slashed 
from a variable rate peaking at 35% to a flat rate of 21% for most large 
corporations.99  While this provision has been revered as the “largest 
reduction in U.S. corporate tax rates in our nation’s history[,]”100  some 
analysts predict the reduced corporate tax rate, on its own, will have a 
                                                          
93. Sarah Jane Tribble, Advocates for Patients with Rare Diseases Defend Tax 
Credits for Orphan Drugs, NPR: HEALTH-SHOTS  (Nov. 29, 2017, 4:16 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/11/29/567052592/advocates-for-
patients-with-rare-diseases-defend-tax-credits-for-orphan-drugs (discussing the Tax 
Bill, and asserting that “[w]e need to think about ways we can improve the [ODA] 
and stop people from gaming the system and exploiting it”). 
94. See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 8.  
95. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 
(2017).  
96. Id. pt. I, sec. 13001, § 11(b). 
97. Id. § 904(E).   
98. Id. pt. V, sec. 13401, § 45C.   
99. Id. pt. I, sec. 13001, § 11(b); see also Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: Overview of 
Provisions Affecting Business, MAXWELL, LOCKE, & RITTER (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.mlrpc.com/articles/tax-cuts-jobs-act-overview-provisions-affecting-
businesses. 
100. Zachary Brennan, Senate, House Agree to Cut Orphan Drug Research 
Credit in Half in Tax Bill, RAPS: REGULATORY FOCUS (Dec. 18, 2017), 
https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84%A2/news-articles/2017/12/senate,-
house-agree-to-cut-orphan-drug-research-credit-in-half-in-tax-bill.  
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negative or insubstantial impact on pharmaceutical cash.101  However, 
most agree that coupling it with the repatriation provision provides a 
windfall for large pharmaceutical companies and their investors.102  The 
special repatriation rate encourages corporations to bring overseas cash 
back to the U.S.  Instead of paying the corporate tax rate on profits held 
overseas, companies will get a one-time deal that taxes them 
approximately 15.5% on funds they bring back to the United States 
economy.103  “Companies such as Johnson & Johnson, Amgen, Gilead, 
Pfizer and Merck all keep more than 80% of their cash overseas.”104  
Accordingly, the decreased cost of bringing overseas cash back to the 
U.S. is considered a major victory for the bio-pharma industry.105  
However, this bonus does not come without sacrifice. 
Since 1983, the tax credit for orphan drug manufacturers has been 
issued at a rate of 50% of all R&D costs.106  This was one of the greatest 
financial incentives available to bio-pharma manufacturers under the 
                                                          
101. The corporate tax rate is likely to have little impact on the biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical industries because the average effective tax rate across all 
companies in these sectors is already estimated at approximately 20%.  See Aswarth 
Damodaran, TAX RATES BY SECTOR (US), NYU: STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS (Jan. 
2018), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ New_Home_Page/datafile/taxrate.htm; 
but see Trefis Team, A Look at Big Pharma’s Value Sensitivity to Changes in Tax 
Rates, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2018, 3:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/great 
speculations/2018/01/11/a-look-at-big-pharmas-value-sensitivity-to-changes-in-tax-
rates/#705523e614d5 (noting “many companies will see a significant impact from 
changes in their effective tax rates . . . it will boil down to the expected taxable income 
growth and the expected change in their effective tax rate”).   
102. Editorial: Drug Firms Lead the Way on Pocketing Tax Cuts, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorial 
-drug-firms-lead-the-way-on-pocketing-tax-cuts/article_f88c2f67 -8ec6-5875-9230-
ec7260fadc95.html (“A new survey of U.S. companies from analysts at Morgan 
Stanley estimates that 43 percent of the savings from the [Tax Bill] will be paid to 
investors in the form of higher dividends and stock buybacks.”); see also 
@jimtankersley, TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2018, 7:59 AM), https://twitter.com/jim 
tankersley/status/962370393016291328.  
103. Editorial, supra note 102; see Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 
pt. I, sec. 13001, § 904(E), 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
104. Brennan, supra note 100; see also @bradloncar, TWITTER (Nov. 29, 2017, 
11:45 AM), https://twitter.com/bradloncar/status/935957450481717255.  
105. Brennan, supra note 100.  
106. See Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).  
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ODA.107  But, after thirty-five years of substantial savings on the R&D 
of drugs for rare diseases, the Tax Bill slashed this handsome reward in 
half.108  “The House bill had originally sought to eliminate the tax credit 
entirely, meanwhile the Senate bill sought reforms that would reduce 
the credit rate to 27.5% of qualified clinical testing expenses.”109  
Ultimately, legislators agreed to reduce the credit to 25% of qualified 
clinical testing expenses.110  Proponents of the cut flaunt its $32.5 
billion in projected government savings over the next ten years.111  
Meanwhile, those opposed to cutting the orphan drug credit argue that 
it could both “stifle research on new medications and make the cost of 
prescriptions even more expensive.”112  Thirty-six patient 
organizations, including NORD, banded together in opposition of the 
weakened orphan tax credit.113  Surprisingly, biopharma leaders did not 
oppose the Tax Bill, likely due to the Bill’s favorable repatriation rate 
and corporate tax provisions. 
                                                          
107. Tribble & Lupkin, supra note 63 (noting “advocates as well as critics of 
the industry say tax credits have been an important motivation for companies”). 
108. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, pt. V, sec. 13401, § 45C, 131 
Stat. 2054 (2017). 
109. Brennan, supra note 100.   
110. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 45C. Stat. 2054 (2017). 
111. Brennan, supra note 100.   
112. Jessica Waltman, President Trump Signs Tax Cuts and Job Act: Impact on 
Health Care and Benefits, KISTLER, TIFFANY BENEFITS (Dec. 26, 2017), 
https://ktbenefits.com/2017/12/congress-passes-tax-reform-impact-on-health-care-
and-benefits.   
113. Christina Jensen, Statement by 36 Patient Organizations in Opposition to 
Senate’s Proposed Weakening of the Orphan Drug Tax Credit, NORD (Nov. 14, 
2017), https://rarediseases.org/statement-36-patient-organizations-opposition-senates 
-proposed-weakening-orphan-drug-tax-credit.  See also Letter from Nat. Org. for Rare 
Disorders, to Division of Dockets Management, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Re: 
Docket No. FDA-2017-D-6380-0005: Guidance: Clarification of Orphan Drug 
Designation of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common 
Diseases (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.regulations. gov/document?D=FDA-2017-D-
6380-0016 [hereinafter NORD Letter].   
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B. The FDA Guidance Elevates R&D Requirements and Eliminates 
Orphan Designations for Some Pediatric Subpopulations 
The Tax Bill was introduced almost simultaneously with a draft 
Guidance issued by the FDA, which aims to close the PREA 
“loophole.”114  The Guidance explains the FDA’s approach as follows: 
FDA intends to no longer continue to grant pediatric-subpopulation 
designation.  Pediatric-subpopulation designation is no longer 
necessary to stimulate the study of drugs in pediatric populations, 
now that various programs, such as PREA and BPCA, have proven 
to be effective in achieving those ends.  Therefore, if a sponsor 
requests orphan drug designation for a pediatric subpopulation of a 
common disease [in adults], and even if the pediatric subpopulation 
prevalence is below 200,000, FDA will not grant orphan drug 
designation to that pediatric subpopulation unless: 
1. the disease in the pediatric population constitutes a valid 
orphan subset, and the drug meets all the other criteria for 
orphan designation; or 
2. the sponsor can adequately demonstrate that the disease in 
the pediatric subpopulation is a different disease from the 
disease in the adult population, and the drug meets all other 
criteria for orphan designation.  For example, if as a 
scientific matter, efficacy from clinical studies in the adult 
population could not be extrapolated to the pediatric 
subpopulation, such information may be considered a 
different disease.115 
Ironically, the Guidance is titled “Clarification of Orphan 
Designations of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of 
Common Diseases[.]”116  It may seem oxy-moronic to clarify orphan 
designations for common diseases when the ODA makes clear that its 
incentives apply only to rare diseases.117  Yet, this is precisely where 
the controversy lies: where do you draw the line between rare and 
                                                          
114. See GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 4 (explaining the Guidance was created 
“in order to close the loophole created by the interaction of the practice of granting 
pediatric-subpopulation designation and the PREA orphan exemption”).  
115. Id. at 4–5.   
116. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).  
117. See generally Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983); 
21 U.S.C. § 360aa-ff (2017). 
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 55 [2019], No. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol55/iss2/4
Kozdrey camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 7/10/2019  9:06 AM 
2019] ROBBING THE CRADLE 409 
common diseases when the prevalence of those aliments varies between 
adult and pediatric populations?  More importantly, should ODA 
incentives be withheld for rare pediatric diseases merely because those 
diseases occur commonly in adults?  If so, to what extent will 
withholding ODA incentives stifle the production of pediatric 
treatments?  Curiously, the FDA leaves many of these questions 
unanswered. 
In response, NORD issued a letter calling on the FDA to (1) provide 
substantive evidence detailing how the alleged “loophole” in PREA has 
been exploited, (2) offer “additional analysis on the possibility for 
pediatric drug development and research to actually be weakened by 
this move rather than strengthened,” and (3) clarify ambiguities in its 
Guidance to ensure “pediatric subpopulations of rare diseases continue 
to receive orphan designation since there are few other incentives for 
development.”118  Similarly, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), as well as BIO, issued letters 
asking the FDA to “tailor the scope of the [G]uidance to preserve 
incentives for developing drugs for rare pediatric diseases,” and clarify 
the terms “pediatric subpopulation(s)” and “pediatric-subpopulation 
designation(s).”119  Like NORD, both PhRMA and BIO also question 
the pervasiveness of the industry’s alleged exploitation of the 
“loophole” highlighted in the Guidance.120  At the crux of these 
                                                          
118. NORD Letter, supra note 113, at 2–3.  
119. See Letter from PhRMA to Division of Dockets Management, U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., Re: Docket No. FDA-2017-D-6380: Clarification of Orphan 
Designation of Drugs and Biologics for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common 
Diseases; Draft Guidance for Industry (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.regulations.gov 
/document?D=FDA-2017-D-6380-0017 [hereinafter PhRMA Letter]; see also Letter 
from BIO to Dockets Management Branch, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Re: Docket 
No. FDA-2017-D-6380: Clarification of Orphan Designation of Drugs and Biologics 
for Pediatric Subpopulations of Common Diseases (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.reg 
ulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-D-6380-0012 [hereinafter BIO Letter]. 
120. See PhRMA Letter, supra note 119 (“PhRMA is concerned with the 
implication in the draft guidance that sponsors are acting inappropriately by taking 
advantage of a ‘loophole’ to avoid completing studies in pediatric subpopulations.  
PhRMA respectfully disagrees with this characterization and, to the extent such a 
‘loophole’ exists, believes that it is a legal interpretation of the PREA exemption that 
has created this result”); see also BIO Letter, supra note 119 (“[T]he terminology used 
by the FDA in the draft guidance implies that sponsors are acting inappropriately by 
taking advantage of a ‘loophole.’  BIO respectfully disagrees and requests that the 
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concerns is the idea that limiting the groups of pediatric conditions that 
qualify for orphan designation reduces incentives to such a degree that 
it negatively affects the development and accessibility of treatments for 
rare childhood diseases. 
IV. THE PROOF IS IN THE PUDDING: OUTLINING THE EVIDENCE FOR 
AND AGAINST PROPOSED EFFECTS ON PRICE AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
PEDIATRIC ORPHAN DRUGS 
Unique issues arise when the concerns of patient advocacy groups 
align with the those of bio-pharma lobbyists.  The concerns expressed 
by NORD,121 PhRMA,122 and BIO123 about the Guidance correspond 
with fears surrounding the new Tax Bill.  These groups’ concerns focus 
on two common issues.  First, how will reduced tax incentives and more 
extensive pediatric research requirements impact the price of drugs for 
rare childhood disorders?  Second, how will these factors impact future 
production and development of pediatric orphan drugs? 
A. Raising Big Pharma’s Allowance: Will Orphan Drug Prices 
Increase? 
According to one report, “the largest, most expensive clinical trials 
for orphan drugs cost about a quarter as much as those for non-orphan 
drugs, after the tax credits are factored in.”124  Yet, the average annual 
cost per patient for orphan drugs in the United States was over 
$140,000, compared with $27,756 for non-orphans.125  Overall, orphan 
                                                          
FDA adjust this language within the guidance to reflect that it has been FDA’s legal 
interpretation of the PREA that has allowed for such designations to be granted[.]”).   
121. See generally NORD Letter, supra note 113.  
122. See generally PhRMA Letter, supra note 119.   
123. See generally BIO Letter, supra note 119.  
124. Carolyn Y. Johnson, High Prices Make Once-Neglected ‘Orphan’ Drugs 
a Booming Business, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016), https://washingtonpost.com/ 
business/economy/high-prices-make-once-neglected-orpahn-drugs-a-booming-busin 
ess/2016/08/04/539d0968-1e10-11e6-9c81-4be1c14fb8c8_story.html?noredirect=on 
&utm_term=.25a7a6514679.  
125. EVALUATEPHARMA, ORPHAN DRUG REPORT 2017, 9 (4th ed. 2017), 
http://info.evaluategroup.com/rs/607-YGS-364/images/EPOD17.pdf.   
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drug sales increased by 12.2% between 2015 and 2016; meanwhile, 
non-orphan drug sales increased by a mere 2.4%.126 
Patient populations are much smaller for true orphan indications, 
and a smaller market makes it more difficult to recoup even discounted 
R&D costs.  However, the exorbitant price mark-ups do not necessarily 
correspond with the cost of development.127  It has long been 
understood that pharmaceutical companies charge what the market will 
bear,128 rather than some calculated percentage of their clinical 
expenditures.  This means reducing tax credits, or escalating R&D costs 
through mandated pediatric testing, may not have a significant impact 
on pediatric orphan drug pricing. 
1. Examining the Industry’s Lack of Transparency 
Assessing the true R&D costs and fair price for a new drug is 
extremely difficult because the pharmaceutical industry operates free 
from transparency requirements.129  This leads to increased scrutiny of 
the bio-pharma industry.130  As a result, “companies such as Eli Lilly 
and Johnson & Johnson have given peaks [sic] behind the curtain of 
drug pricing decisions.”131  Meanwhile, other companies – including 
Allergan, AbbVie, and Novo Nordisk – have implemented “social 
contracts” with patients, pledging to limit the number of annual price 
increases and to keep price hikes in the single-digit percentages.132 
                                                          
126. Id. at 8.  
127. See id. at 11 (noting that, instead, prices correlate with patient population 
size).   
128. Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and 
Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 244 n.184 (1999) 
(citing Frederick T. Schut & Peter A.G. Van Bergeijk, International Price 
Discrimination: The Pharmaceutical Industry, 44 WORLD DEV. 1141, 1142 (1986)) 
(“the pharmaceutical industry charges what the market will bear”).   
129. Gilbert Carrillo, Drug Transparency Laws Will Not Drive Pharmaceutical 
Prices Down and Will Only Stifle Innovation, 25 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVE 77, 80 (2015).   
130. See Bell, supra note 61 (“[P]ushback from consumers, PBMs, payers and 
lawmakers has become much stronger as of late[.]”).   
131. Id.   
132. Id.; see, e.g., Brent Saunders, Our Social Contract with Patients, CEO 
BLOG (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.allergan.com/news/ceo-blog/september-2016/our-
25
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In September 2016, Allergan became the first company to 
voluntarily promise to limit its annual drug price increases to single-
digit percentages.  Although the use of social contracts as self-imposed 
price regulations is a new and unpopular practice among the majority 
of pharmaceutical leaders, the significant long-term impacts are already 
apparent.133  However, effectuating a voluntary program that slashes 
financial returns in half requires a delicate balance between the 
regulatory restraints that seek to protect patient interests and the 
autonomous business interests of drug makers.134  Unfortunately, 
neither the Tax Bill, nor the Guidance come anywhere close to 
addressing the issue of transparency or pharmaceutical pricing 
restraints.  Meanwhile, some drug manufacturers have stopped 
pretending that R&D costs justify their price markers.  For example, 
In a slide deck released to a Senate committee last year, Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals International outlined its reasoning for a price hike 
for Syprine, a three-decade-old-rare-disease drug that ultimately 
went from $652 for 100 capsules to $21,267 over a five-year period.  
The slide explains the reason for the price hike: “Progressive pricing 
actions to bring in line with comparable Orphan products.”135 
Likewise, Martin Shkreli136 attempted to justify his company’s 
exponentially high price-increase for Daraprim, an old drug used to 
                                                          
social-contract-with-patients (“Where we increase price on our branded therapeutic 
medicines, we will take price increases no more than once per year and, when we do, 
they will be limited to single digit percentage increases.”).   
133. For example, Allergan “raised 2017 list prices by an average of only 6.7 
percent” when the overall “average price increase for branded drugs was 12.92 percent 
in 2016.”  Joanna Shepherd, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Social Contract With 
Patients, MORNING CONSULT (Sept. 5, 2017), https://morningconsult.com/opinions 
/pharmaceutical-industrys-social-contract-patients/.  The effect of annual price 
increases accumulates over time, “with a 12.92-percent annual price increase resulting 
in drug prices that are twice what a 6.7-percent annual price increase would produce 
in 15 years.”  Id. 
134. Id.   
135. Johnson, supra note 124.  
136. Martin Shkreli, criticized as “the most hated man in America,” is a former 
pharmaceutical executive who became notorious for raising the price of Daraprim 
from $13.50 per pill to $750 per pill.  Zoe Thomas & Tim Swift, Who is Martin Shkreli 
– “The Most Hated Man in America”?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-us-canada-34331761.  
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fight a rare infection, by explaining “[t]his drug is priced similarly to 
other drugs for rare disease, and I think physicians understand that.”137  
The truth is, “[n]owhere are the strange economics of drug pricing more 
difficult to understand than when a drug invented decades earlier is 
granted orphan status – and an orphan price.”138 
When consumers are already being price-gouged for age-old drugs 
that required little to no R&D expenditures, how are we to arrive at the 
conclusion that decreased orphan tax incentives will do anything other 
than render even higher pricing?  The practice is already in place, and 
pharmaceutical sponsors admit their pricing does not necessarily 
parallel their R&D costs.139  Indeed, even a cursory review of clinical 
expenditures and profits for orphan drugs reinforces the notion that 
development costs do not correlate to increased drug prices. 
2. A Brief Comparison of Orphan Drug Development Costs Versus 
Pricing 
Although a lack of transparency in the pharmaceutical industry 
impedes access to abundant data sources, a holistic review of cost 
versus profit is still possible.  A research study published by the Journal 
of the American Medical Association (“ JAMA”) in September 2017 
provided an estimate of R&D spending, as well as profits, for ten cancer 
drugs of which nine hold orphan designations.140  The researchers 
explain, “[a] common justification for high cancer drug prices is the 
sizeable [R&D] outlay necessary to bring a drug to the U.S. market.”141  
However, the study found that the approximate “cost to develop a 
cancer drug is $648.0 million, a figure significantly lower than prior 
estimates.”142  Meanwhile, “the revenue since approval is substantial,” 
averaging $1,658.4 million, and ranging from $204.1 million to 
$22,275.0 million.143 
                                                          
137. Johnson, supra note 124.   
138. Id.  
139. See id. 
140. Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending 
to Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 JAMA 
INT’L MED. 1569 (2017).   
141. Id. at 1569. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
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A separate study, issued by EvaluatePharma in 2016, noted a 
correlation between the available patient population and the revenue per 
patient for the top 20 selling orphan drugs.144  The study also found that 
as the patient population got smaller (i.e. fewer than 10,000), the 
correlation became closer.145  This confirms “industry perceptions that 
smaller patient groups allow a pricing premium to be achieved versus 
non-orphans.”146  This reinforces the idea that orphan drug pricing is 
not tethered to R&D costs.  Instead, the market is based on “innovation 
premiums for drugs that create a step change in treatment options and 
therapy outcomes.”147 
“The high prices of orphan drugs have been detached from the 
[ODA’s] original rationale – that incentives are necessary for 
companies to recoup the costs of [R&D] of treatments with tiny 
markets.”148  The pricing schema has also been removed from consumer 
idealism, i.e., the idea that the profit margin should correspond with 
production costs.  Today, the “[orphan] market has come to expect high 
prices for any drug that treats very few patients.”149  What is worse is 
“the system lacks any real mechanism to counter the price increases.”150  
“Drug companies argue that any change to incentives could lead the 
industry to abandon orphans once more.”151  Patients and advocates 
have the same concern.  However, these reports also demonstrate that 
“orphan drugs give companies virtually unlimited pricing power,”152 
irrespective of the Tax Bill’s diminished incentives or the Guidance’s 
added R&D requirements. 
                                                          
144. EVALUATEPHARMA, supra note 125, at 11.  
145. Id.  
146. Id. (asserting “Soliris confirms the pricing power resulting from 
indications with the fewest number of patients”).   
147. Id. (using the Gleevec product as an example). 
148. Johnson, supra note 124.  
149. Id. 
150. Id.  
151. Id. 
152. Id.  
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B. A Time-Out for Drug Development: Will the Tax Bill and 
Guidance Lead to Reduced Engagement in the Pediatric Orphan Drug 
Market? 
While pricing concerns appear unsubstantiated, suspicion that the 
Tax Bill and Guidance will impede innovation and deter participation 
in the already vulnerable pediatric orphan drug market is merited.  In 
its letter to the FDA, NORD expressed concerns that there may be rare 
pediatric subpopulations that would have received R&D under the 
previous incentive structure that will now be ignored.153  The 
organization explains, “[b]oth PREA and BPCA exist to encourage 
these studies, but PREA requirements can be avoided using the 
sometimes unpredictable waiver and deferral process, and the six 
months of exclusivity offered by BPCA has not shown to be an 
adequate incentive in every case.”154  Essentially, NORD argues that 
despite the Guidance’s aim to encourage pediatric testing, drug makers 
can easily get around PREA research requirements through waivers. 
In fact, by eliminating a company’s eligibility to receive ODA 
benefits for some pediatric subpopulations, the Guidance actually 
encourages business-minded drug makers to seek a PREA waiver.  
Now, instead of receiving the abundant financial incentives and seven 
years of added exclusivity under the ODA, the drug maker is left with 
a mere six months of additional exclusivity under BPCA.  If the six-
month incentive alone is not enough to satisfy its return on investment, 
the drug maker will be effectively deterred from pursuing R&D in the 
pediatric subpopulation.  This problem is intensified for small-scale and 
startup pharmaceutical companies that rely heavily on the incentives 
accrued by orphan designations.155  Aevi Genomic Medicine, in its 
responsive letter to the FDA Guidance, argues “[w]ithout these 
incentives, developing drugs for children can be prohibitively 
expensive and practically impossible for small companies.”156 
                                                          
153. NORD Letter, supra note 113, at 2.  
154. Id.  
155. Aevi Letter, supra note 9, at 1.  
156. Id.  
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1. Using PREA’s Waiver System to Avoid Pediatric Testing in 
Orphan Subpopulations 
PREA’s waiver system provides a means for drug maker avoid its 
obligation to conduct pediatric testing even where the Guidance would 
otherwise impose such a requirement.  A full waiver of PREA’s 
requirement to submit pediatric assessments is granted if “[n]ecessary 
studies are impossible or highly impracticable (because, for example, 
the number of patients is so small or the patients are geographically 
dispersed)[.]”157  One important challenge that has persisted with 
pharmaceutical testing in children under BPCA and PREA is the 
“relatively small population of potential test subjects.”158  “With 
children accounting for only 24.6% of the United States population, it 
is hard to find enough children to participate in studies.”159  In addition, 
“the size of this country makes it nearly impossible to confine the study 
to a particular geographic area as children with a specific condition are 
likely to spread across the country.”160  With only a small number of 
participants, “studies may not be able to generate statistically reliable 
information concerning the effectiveness of a drug relative to a control 
group or a placebo.”161  The problem is exacerbated when the 
subpopulation is narrowed due to the rarity of a disease in children, even 
if that same disease is widespread in adults.  This is one reason it makes 
sense to exempt orphan drugs from the more stringent pediatric research 
requirements imposed by PREA.162  Theoretically, it also may be why 
drug makers are able to easily secure a waiver or deferral from PREA’s 
clinical study requirements as NORD suggests.163 
A comparative study conducted by members of the FDA and the 
European Medicines Agency (“EMA”) examined some of the waivers 
                                                          
157. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: HOW TO COMPLY 
WITH THE PEDIATRIC RESEARCH EQUITY ACT; DRAFT GUIDANCE (2005) (citing The 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C § 505B(a)(4)(A)(i) (1938)).   
158. See Jerles, supra note 42, at 523.  
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. (citing INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., ETHICAL CONDUCT OF 
CLINICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING CHILDREN 27, 81 (2004)). 
162. See generally NORD Letter, supra note 113. 
163. Id. at 2.  
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granted under PREA between 2007 and 2013.164  Several waivers were 
granted because the potential pediatric study population was too 
small.165  For example, the FDA granted a full PREA waiver to Bracco 
Diagnostics for CardioGen-82 (rubidium-82), a drug used to treat 
coronary artery disease.166  “For the proposed adult indication, [the 
FDA] considered that the number of pediatric patients with coronary 
artery disease was too small and granted the waiver based on rarity of 
the disease, rendering pediatric studies impossible or highly 
impractical.”167  Similarly, when considering a PREA waiver for 
zoledronic acid, the FDA “waived the requirement to conduct pediatric 
studies in osteoporosis because of the rarity of the disease in the 
pediatric population.”168 
The FDA-EMA study also compared the number of waivers 
granted in the United States to those granted in Europe.169  The data 
collected provides some insight into the ease with which drug makers 
can evade PREA’s pediatric testing requirements.170  Of the products 
reviewed for waivers by both the EMA and the FDA, the agencies 
adopted similar opinions about whether or not the waiver should be 
granted 86% of the time.171  The agencies boasted the value of these 
parallel outcomes, noting that “[t]his harmonization of scientific 
opinion is encouraging.”172  They explain, “while medical research in 
children is of the utmost importance to facilitate the development of 
safe and effective medicines for the pediatric population, regulatory 
agencies need to grant [waivers] from pediatric medical research 
                                                          
164. See generally Gunter F. Egger, et al., A Comparative Review of Waivers 
Granted in Pediatric Drug Development by FDA and EMA from 2007-2013, 50 
THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 639, 639–47 (2016).  
165. Id. at 643.   
166. Id.; see Letter from U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Bracco Diagnostics Inc., 
NDA 19-414/S-012 (July 29, 2010), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_ 
docs/appletter/2010/019414s012ltr.pdf.  
167. Egger, supra note 164, at 643; NORD Letter, supra note 113.   
168. Egger, supra note 164.   
169. Id. at 640. 
170. See id.  
171. Id. at 646. 
172. Id.  
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obligations in selected cases . . . to prevent unnecessary clinical 
research in children, a vulnerable population.”173 
Notably, the EMA granted 88% of such waivers requested for 
single active substance products.174  However, “of the 405 full waiver 
requests submitted” to the EMA, only 80 (20%) were also reviewed by 
the FDA during the study period.175  This variance is largely attributed 
to the different regulatory structures in the U.S. versus the E.U.176  
Namely, the PREA “loophole” exempts orphan products “from 
pediatric research requirements in the U.S., whereas they are not 
exempt from obligations of the Paediatric Regulation in the E.U.”177  
However, the FDA’s new Guidance now brings these varied regulatory 
structures into closer alignment. 
Like the European system, the Guidance eliminates pediatric 
testing exemptions previously available to certain orphan products 
under PREA,178 leaving drug makers with only one option – waivers.  
Accordingly, the U.S. is likely to see an increase in PREA waiver 
requests which would mirror the quantity reported in the E.U., and with 
an 86% similarity index between EMA and FDA decisions, it is fair to 
predict that the FDA will also mimic the EMA’s outcomes when it 
comes to granting waivers.  Hence, if the FDA matches the EMA’s 88% 
approval rate of pediatric testing waivers, a substantial number of drugs 
will now be excused from pediatric testing.  Further, under the new 
Guidance, these drugs will no longer receive any of the ODA benefits 
used to entice manufacturers to engage in such testing despite an 
exemption. 
2. The Prohibitive Effect on Small Bio-Pharma Companies 
Aevi, a small genomic development company, contends that 
“without orphan designation[s], the development of novel drugs and 
biologics in children is much more difficult and in many cases, 
practically impossible” because “[c]linical trials in pediatric 
                                                          
173. Id. at 646 
174. Id. at 642. 
175. Id. at 644. 
176. Id. at 645. 
177. Id.  
178. See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 8.  
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populations, especially orphan populations are often difficult and 
arduous.”179  Aevi explains that most of the companies engaged in the 
production of pediatric orphan drugs are small-scale organizations that 
“can benefit greatly from the incentives provided by orphan drug 
designation.”180  Specifically, Aevi explains that the seven years of 
regulatory exclusivity the ODA offers has been crucial to the 
development of older drugs that have a limited patent life for new 
pediatric indications.181 
Small-to-medium-sized companies require exclusivity to provide 
stockholders with a guarantee that competitors cannot infringe upon its 
products.”182  Although “diseases affecting 200,000 Americans are 
‘rare’ under the law, they may represent sizeable – even hugely 
profitable – markets for small companies.”183  In addition, orphan 
designations under the ODA are based solely on U.S. disease 
populations.184  Because the ODA “does not account for the potential 
profits on international sales,” its incentives become even more enticing 
for companies both small and large.185  The proof of profitability for 
orphan drug manufacturers benefiting from the ODA’s financial 
                                                          
179. Aevi Letter, supra note 9, at 1.   
180. Id.; see also Suzanne Shelley, Orphan Drug Commercialization is 
Maturing, PHARMACEUTICAL COMMERCE (Sept. 1, 2016), http://pharmaceutical 
commerce.com/brand-marketing-communications/orphan-drug-commercialization-
maturing (noting “many of the companies pursuing orphan drugs have been smaller 
companies”).  But see Joseph Burns, Orphan Drugs: Way Too Many, Way Too 
Expensive, MANAGED CARE: DRUG MANAGEMENT (June 4, 2017), https://www.mana 
gedcaremag.com/archives/2017/6/orphan-drugs-way-too-many-way-too-expensive 
(“When the orphan drug legislation was passed, small pharmaceutical companies and 
universities were developing medications for rare diseases . . . . Right now, all the 
largest pharmaceutical companies are involved in the research and development of 
orphan drugs.”).  
181. See Aevi Letter, supra note 9.  See also Annette K. Kwok, et al., Incentives 
to Repurpose Existing Drugs for Orphan Indications, 6 ACS MED. CHEMISTRY 
LETTERS 828, 828 (2015) (explaining the value of incentives for repurposing existing 
drugs for orphan indications).  
182. Bohrer, supra note 74, at 381 n.74 (citing John Henkel, ORPHAN DRUG 
PRODUCTS: NEW HOPE FOR PEOPLE WITH RARE DISORDERS, FDA SPECIAL REPORT ON 
NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1995)). 
183. Id. at 381.  
184. Id.  
185. Id. 
33
Kozdrey: Robbing the Cradle: The Implications of Depleting Financial Incen
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2019
Kozdrey camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 7/10/2019  9:06 AM 
420 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
incentives has been crucial in establishing the industry.”186  He 
explains, “[the ODA] suddenly created a business model that said you 
can go after these incredibly rare diseases and survive.”187 
The Guidance threatens to minimize access to ODA incentives for 
pediatric subpopulations, which have been fundamental to the 
sustainability of small businesses.  It is also important to note that some 
of the Tax Bill’s favorable corporate benefits do not flow to small-scale 
companies.  For example, pharmaceutical giants that keep substantial 
revenues overseas can reap the benefits of the Bill’s low repatriation 
rate.188  Additionally, to the extent that a profitable company’s effective 
tax rate is lowered by the new corporate tax, their financial yields could 
increase.189  This is not so for small companies that have not yet become 
profitable and do not hold cash overseas.190  Hence, while large-scale 
corporations are able to hedge their loss in orphan tax credits against 
their gains from other provisions, small-scale companies only feel the 
burden of losing an important incentive.  It is unclear whether this loss 
will be enough to push small players out of the orphan drug market 
completely, but it is certainly enough to generate concern. 
Ultimately, big pharma has been awarded a lower corporate tax rate 
and reduced costs for bringing cash back into the U.S.  This translates 
to more cash in corporate pockets with no incentive to direct those 
yields where they are most needed – the orphan drug market.191  In fact, 
there is a direct disincentive for manufacturers to engage in these 
markets of great need due to the reduced orphan tax credit and more 
rigid pediatric testing requirements.  Meanwhile, big pharma continues 
to operate without transparency, and free from requirements to keep 
                                                          
186. Johnson, supra note 124.  
187. Id. 
188. See Brennan, supra note 100; see also @bradloncar, supra note 104.  
189. John Engle, How Tax Reform Will Impact Development Biotech, SEEKING 
ALPHA (Dec. 18, 2017, 8:06 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4132460-tax-
reform-will-impact-developmental-biotech (“Dropping the corporate tax rate . . . will 
be a boon for all case flow positive businesses, but it may have some negative impacts 
on development-stage businesses that are currently burning capital in order to develop 
new products. Such is the case in much of biotech, in which a large number of 
development-stage companies make significant annual losses.”).  
190. Id. 
191. Jennifer Huron, 35 Ways to Celebrate the 35th Anniversary of NORD, 
NORD (Mar. 5, 2018), https://rarediseases.org/35-ways-celebrate-35th-anniversary-
nord (noting that 95% of the 7,000 rare diseases still have no treatment). 
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profits within a reasonable range or to pass savings on to consumers.  
Hence, exorbitant orphan drug pricing remains unchanged and 
pharmaceutical giants prevail with greater profitability. Meanwhile, 
children with rare diseases suffer as the overall value of developing 
treatments for their conditions has been diminished. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its 1983 enactment, the ODA has been monumental in 
spurring the development and accessibility of treatments for rare 
disorders.  The same is true for the impact that BPCA and PREA have 
had on the research and development of drugs for pediatric indications.  
However, industry exploitation of ODA benefits, as well as strategic 
uses of the PREA-ODA “loophole,” run contrary to the legislative 
intent behind these provisions.  Big pharma is reigning in huge profits 
by gaming the systems intended to benefit vulnerable patient 
populations.  In an effort to curb these industry abuses, the 
administration has used the Tax Bill to reduce the orphan tax credit, and 
the FDA issued the Guidance to eliminate drug sponsors’ eligibility to 
receive ODA benefits for some pediatric subpopulations. 
However, these joint efforts fail to address pervasive concerns 
related to the ODA.  For example, although the Guidance prevents 
pediatric orphan designations for diseases commonly manifested in 
adults, it does not address “salami slicing” practices.  In other words, 
drug manufacturers can continue to harvest ODA incentives by 
introducing a drug under its rare indication then catapulting it to a 
blockbuster through off-label and subsequently approved indications.  
This allows for continued abuse of the ODA on a large scale, while 
deterring engagement in pediatric subpopulations – where research is 
arguably most needed. 
In addition, the Tax Bill’s reduced orphan tax credit does not 
address the problems attributed to a lack of price transparency and 
price-gouging in the orphan market.  In fact, the bill’s favorable 
corporate tax rate and repatriation provision allow greater profitability 
for large companies in the mass market.  Meanwhile, it removes 
incentives from small-players who rely heavily on the rare disease 
sector.  Although the Tax Bill and PREA Guidance were introduced, at 
least in part, to curb abuses of the ODA and the PREA “loophole,” there 
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is no indication that these efforts actually advance the interests of 
pediatric orphan drug consumers (i.e. children with rare disease). 
Unfortunately, the combined effect of these administrative efforts 
exemplifies the type of lopsided government action that inadvertently 
advances the interests of drug makers while failing to consider the 
disparate impacts on patients.  The joint measures threaten to, yet again, 
tip the scales in favor of drug makers.  Reducing tax credits and forcing 
drug makers to engage in more extensive pediatric research for rare 
diseases might reduce big pharma’s profits, however, it will not reduce 
patients’ costs or make more treatments available to them.  Ultimately, 
the Tax Bill, coupled with the FDA Guidance, reduces engagement in 
the pediatric orphan drug market while permitting bio-pharma firms to 
price-gouge orphan drug consumers and operate free of transparency or 
profit limitations.  In the end, the only groups that stand to lose are 
children suffering from rare diseases. 
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